Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 2:51:26 GMT -5
This is the outline of the paper I am writing to present for the 16th for a liberal arts symposium (I am doing this with my Philosophy of Mind class, tee hee! ;D).
The argument goes:
1. Suffering exists.
2. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God exists, there can be no gratuitous suffering.
3. If an omnipotent God exists, it can resolve any problem without the need of suffering.
4 (sub-conclusion). Therefore, any suffering is gratuitous suffering.
5 (conclusion). Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist.
Problems with the argument:
There is one major problem: If one defines God in a way that excludes having all three characteristics (i.e. an all-powerful evil God), the argument does not work.
Objections to the argument:
As far as I know, each objection centers around premise 3.
1. Free will objection- "It is logically impossible for God to create free creatures and guarantee that they will not do evil."
Response: In order for the free will objection to hold, the person must also show that free will does exist to begin with (this objection would not hold against a compatibilist or determinist) in order for the objection to stand. Secondly, the premise is true only if *ABSOLUTE* free will is being defended. Yet, such a position is untenable. Even if we do free will, there would be limits on it, especially physical limits (i.e. we cannot choose to sprout wings and fly). In addition, if we can present one action where no moral conflict arises and a free choice could be made, then the above objection falls. A simple example goes as this: Coffee or tea? In the same vein, one can say it is possible for God to make people capable of having free will and choosing between several good choices without a contradiction arising.
2. Soul-building- In this objection, we are told suffering is necessary to build us into the person God wants. Yet, this is the crux of premise 3: If God is omnipotent, is God able to accomplish the *SAME* ends without suffering? If yes, then premise 3 stands and the conclusion necessarily follows. If no, then two options arise. Either the theist must deny God is omnipotent, or point out the logical impossibility of solving problems without suffering.
2a. Kreeft's objection- Dr. Peter Kreeft in his book Making Sense Out of Suffering states that we unconsciously prefer a world of suffering as it makes the world more interesting. Kreeft uses an analogy that given two stories (one in which the hero accomplishes his goal quickly, easily, and without suffering as opposed to suffering throughout the story and only finally triumphing), that we prefer the one with suffering, and that the same applies to life. Yet, Dr. Eva Dadlez in her book What's Hecuba to Him? uses Hamlet's question of "What's Hecuba to him, and he to Hecuba, that he should weep for her?" to examine the idea of emotional connections to fictional characters, and explores why we might enjoy stories that we enjoy suffering (and to which we respond in grief, but enjoy this). Dr. Dadlez develops the Aristotelian idea of catharsis, in which we enjoy the release of emotional in these fictional events that make us cry, which we can enjoy and simultaneously wish to avoid them in reality.
3. "God is beyond morality"- This objection denies that God is omnibenevolent by saying that God is not a moral being- he is amoral. As such, this objection refutes itself.
4. "Morality is based upon God's will/nature, and any such claims of gratuitous suffering presuppose the existence of God"- The problem with this objection, other than circular reasoning, is that by using either God's will or nature for the basis of morality, you cannot objectively account for morals. Refuting "Morality on God's will" is easier, since this is known as divine command morality: If God willed murder to be good, it would become good. As such, DCM actually destroys any objective moral basis. However, the latter is a more subtle version of the same problem. Suppose the universe where Twin Earth is, God's nature is that so that it his nature to command murder as good. Jones on Twin Earth would grow up believing murder to be good, whereas ourselves on Earth would be led to believe murder to be wrong.
The argument goes:
1. Suffering exists.
2. If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient God exists, there can be no gratuitous suffering.
3. If an omnipotent God exists, it can resolve any problem without the need of suffering.
4 (sub-conclusion). Therefore, any suffering is gratuitous suffering.
5 (conclusion). Therefore, an omnipotent, omniscient, and omnibenevolent God does not exist.
Problems with the argument:
There is one major problem: If one defines God in a way that excludes having all three characteristics (i.e. an all-powerful evil God), the argument does not work.
Objections to the argument:
As far as I know, each objection centers around premise 3.
1. Free will objection- "It is logically impossible for God to create free creatures and guarantee that they will not do evil."
Response: In order for the free will objection to hold, the person must also show that free will does exist to begin with (this objection would not hold against a compatibilist or determinist) in order for the objection to stand. Secondly, the premise is true only if *ABSOLUTE* free will is being defended. Yet, such a position is untenable. Even if we do free will, there would be limits on it, especially physical limits (i.e. we cannot choose to sprout wings and fly). In addition, if we can present one action where no moral conflict arises and a free choice could be made, then the above objection falls. A simple example goes as this: Coffee or tea? In the same vein, one can say it is possible for God to make people capable of having free will and choosing between several good choices without a contradiction arising.
2. Soul-building- In this objection, we are told suffering is necessary to build us into the person God wants. Yet, this is the crux of premise 3: If God is omnipotent, is God able to accomplish the *SAME* ends without suffering? If yes, then premise 3 stands and the conclusion necessarily follows. If no, then two options arise. Either the theist must deny God is omnipotent, or point out the logical impossibility of solving problems without suffering.
2a. Kreeft's objection- Dr. Peter Kreeft in his book Making Sense Out of Suffering states that we unconsciously prefer a world of suffering as it makes the world more interesting. Kreeft uses an analogy that given two stories (one in which the hero accomplishes his goal quickly, easily, and without suffering as opposed to suffering throughout the story and only finally triumphing), that we prefer the one with suffering, and that the same applies to life. Yet, Dr. Eva Dadlez in her book What's Hecuba to Him? uses Hamlet's question of "What's Hecuba to him, and he to Hecuba, that he should weep for her?" to examine the idea of emotional connections to fictional characters, and explores why we might enjoy stories that we enjoy suffering (and to which we respond in grief, but enjoy this). Dr. Dadlez develops the Aristotelian idea of catharsis, in which we enjoy the release of emotional in these fictional events that make us cry, which we can enjoy and simultaneously wish to avoid them in reality.
3. "God is beyond morality"- This objection denies that God is omnibenevolent by saying that God is not a moral being- he is amoral. As such, this objection refutes itself.
4. "Morality is based upon God's will/nature, and any such claims of gratuitous suffering presuppose the existence of God"- The problem with this objection, other than circular reasoning, is that by using either God's will or nature for the basis of morality, you cannot objectively account for morals. Refuting "Morality on God's will" is easier, since this is known as divine command morality: If God willed murder to be good, it would become good. As such, DCM actually destroys any objective moral basis. However, the latter is a more subtle version of the same problem. Suppose the universe where Twin Earth is, God's nature is that so that it his nature to command murder as good. Jones on Twin Earth would grow up believing murder to be good, whereas ourselves on Earth would be led to believe murder to be wrong.