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Post by The Jacket on Apr 13, 2003 2:35:57 GMT -5
As dumb as it probably sounds, I'm still a bit confused. I'd probably have to talk to you via messanger about it so I can get it clearly.... I can quote John 3:16 though... ;D
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Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 3:06:18 GMT -5
I can quote the Bhagavad Gita too. ;D
'sides, I already know John 3:16. ;D
Anyhow, this is basically the basis of epistemology, the branch of philosophy that deals with what knowledge is, and how we obtain it.
The standard definition of knowledge is justified, true belief. There have been conflicts over that definition over the Gettier problem (which I won't go into) which usually leads to modification of the standard tripartite method. If you're curious, I don't see much of the problem with the Gettier problem, as I think that justification should be constantly re-evaluated... plus, I think that we use knowledge inappropriately in areas that we actually don't "know". As there's a distinction between a common belief, a reasonable belief (belief in something based upon a strong amount of evidence for it), and knowledge. Of course, the problems with such a distinction is that knowledge might be unattainable, as one could solve the knowledge problem by saying you need 100% certainty to have knowledge, which makes most things not qualify as knowledge. Anyhow, beyond that tangent...
A deductive argument is an argument that argues from general premises to a specific conclusion. The first major important thing about deductive arguments is validity. If an argument is valid, then *IF ALL* the premises are true, *THEN* the conclusion *MUST* be true too. This isn't to say that the conclusion is true, as a premise could be unsound. Popular valid forms include:
Modus Ponens:
1. If A, then B. 2. A. 3. Therefore, B.
For example:
1. If Mary is a mother, then she must be a woman. 2. Mary is a mother. 3. Therefore, Mary must be a woman.
Modus Tollens:
1. If A, then B. 2. Not B. 3. Therefore, Not A.
Example:
1. If Mary is a mother, then she must be a woman. 2. Mary is not a woman. 3. Therefore, Mary is not a mother.
Of course, one must not mix these forms around, otherwise you get two formal fallacies, which are invalid forms, called affirming the consequent and denying the antecedent.
Affirming the consequent:
1. If A, then B. 2. B. 3. Therefore, A.
Example:
1. If Mary is a mother, then she must be a woman. 2. Mary is a woman. 3. Therefore, Mary is a mother.
This is invalid because the conclusion doesn't necessarily follow (i.e. there are lots of woman who aren't mothers).
Denying the antecedent:
1. If A, then B. 2. Not A. 3. Therefore, Not B.
Example:
1. If Mary is a mother, then she must be a woman. 2. Mary is not a mother. 3. Therefore, Mary is not a woman.
Again, it is invalid because the conclusion does not necessarily follow.
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Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 3:22:30 GMT -5
Another valid form is Disjunctive Syllogisms. They go:
1. Either A or B. 2. Not B (or A). 3. A (or B).
1. Either Joe is a bachelor or a married man. 2. Joe is not married. 3. Therefore, Joe is a bachelor.
A minor thing to note is that one show avoid the informal fallacy of a False Dilemma, which presents options as being the only ones, when others exist.
A good example is: "America- Love it or Leave it!", which ignores other options, such as disliking it and doing something about it.
The final one I'll mention is Reducio Ad Absurdum. What this form does is assume a claim is true and argue a contradiction from it. RAAs are usually long and quite involved, so I don't have any examples off the top of my head.
The next major thing is soundness for an argument. This involves a valid argument that has all true premises. In which case, the argument necessarily follows.
Inductive arguments argue from specific premises to a general conclusion (i.e. I have heated 300 pans of water, and they boiled at 216 degress Farenheit. Therefore, water boils at 216 degress Farenheit.). They are based upon probability of the event happening (85% of men can run a mile. Jones is a man. Therefore, Jones can run a mile.) Arguments that have 50% or higher of being true are said to be strong (and if they have all true premises, the argument is said to be cogent). Anything less involves a weak argument. The main thing to note is that inductive arguments do NOT guarantee 100% truth. Inductive argumentation is the basis of science due to the repeated testing of a hypothesis to see whether evidence supports it. This is why, for one, although the laws and theories of science are firmly supported (to where it's foolish to deny them), it is possible they could be wrong (i.e. in the future we observe a situation where they do not hold).
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Atolmazel
RPG Townie
"That's one spicy tamale"
Posts: 650
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Post by Atolmazel on Apr 13, 2003 7:33:39 GMT -5
(You left out Kant, Sleepy). As a matter of interest, do you subscribe to tabula rasa or a priori theory of knowledge?
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Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 11:33:47 GMT -5
I didn't want to give a gigantic lecture (too late!).
It's been a while since I thought on this one (and I take epistemology next fall, along with philosophy of religion... "and there was much rejoicing.... yay"), but if I remember right, I do hold to a more Russellian position of a priori knowledge existing, but learned empirically. I also remember something about analytic a posterori knowledge that I heard of when reading Kripke, but I have to re-read my notes to find out what that was about.
EDIT: I don't hold to the blank table position since we do have some biological based thoughts due to our genetic make-up (although whether we're going to say that instincts for certain actions is considered starting knowledge or not is a moot point I suppose).
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Atolmazel
RPG Townie
"That's one spicy tamale"
Posts: 650
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Post by Atolmazel on Apr 13, 2003 12:23:51 GMT -5
Personally I find rationalism more appealing. It seems to me that knowledge would be impossible without some way of processing received sense data. You've probably heard of Descartes' wax illustration whereby all the sense properties of the ball have changed yet we still believe it to be the same ball. After studying epistemology I have come to believe that the entire idea of knowledge is farcical.
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Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 12:30:52 GMT -5
Yes, I'm familiar with Meditations. Although the wax ball example is more a question of identity.
I'm still trying to think of whether we can have knowledge if there is the possibility of error, since if a counterexample of having a nigh-certain belief turn out to be wrong we wouldn't consider to have knowledge. Yet, if this possibility arises for all nigh-certain, but not certain beliefs, then can we be said to have knowledge? I tend to dislike a Descartes-like epistemology, but right now I tend towards that route. Of course, I think the problem lies with how we use the term knowledge.
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Atolmazel
RPG Townie
"That's one spicy tamale"
Posts: 650
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Post by Atolmazel on Apr 13, 2003 12:43:15 GMT -5
I flawed my philosophy lecturer the other day on this very subject. I bought up the point that knowledge has to be 100% true and he denied it. I then pointed out that you can't have false knowledge without a contradiction. He just smiled in silence then moved on. I draw my idea of knowledge being impossible from a criticism of the cogito argument. If senses can be in error then why not logic too?
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Post by SleepyTemplar on Apr 13, 2003 12:49:07 GMT -5
Because with the senses there is no problem that arises with them possibly being flawed, and no contradictions. In addition, we have cases where we do see that we interpret sense data incorrectly (our sense organs don't deceive us, we just misinterpret them). For example, suppose waking at night I believe I see a burglar in my room, only to turn on the light to see a jacket on a coathanger. In such a scenario, I was accurately perceiving the world, but misinterpreted what my eyes presented. Whereas, if you deny the law of noncontradiction, then problems arises because any discussion of propositions, knowledge, and evidence presuppose the LoNC. After all, in order to say the LoNC is wrong you have to presuppose it to be true, in which case you've created a self-contradiction right there.
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